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Abstract—The Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-(like)-Noise (KLJN) 
key exchange system is a promising low-cost alternative to the 
quantum key distribution and is based solely on the laws of 
classical physics. Although several papers have been published in 
the field, there is still an ongoing debate about the security of the 
method. In our paper we will give an overview the most 
important findings about the security of the KLJN system and 
show the effects of the non-idealities of the system on the 
information leak. We will also analyze different methods of 
proposed cracking the KLJN protocol, including the latest 
directional coupler attack. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-(like)-Noise (KLJN) or Kish 
key distribution system [1] is a competing very low cost and 
simple alternative to the quantum key distribution systems. 
The security of the system, in contrast to the quantum key 
distribution, is solely based on the laws of classical physics. 
This feature supports the development of secure 
communication systems with orders of magnitude lower cost 
than in the case of quantum based systems, while still 
maintaining the theoretical unconditional security. 
A. Tthe KLJN secure key distribution system 
The original KLJN system uses only passive components: 
two different value resistors (lower and higher values, denoted 
by RL and RH, respectively) at one side (Alice) and other two 
resistors with the same values at the other side (Bob). 
Switches are used to connect one of the resistors to the 
interconnecting wire, while the other terminals of the resistors 
are grounded to realize a closed loop circuit. The Johnson 
noise of the resistors provide random voltage and generate 
random current flowing in the loop. If different resistors at the 
different ends are selected, then in the middle the 
eavesdropper (Eve) can’t determine at which end the lower 
resistor is used. This can be used by the communicating 
parties to realize two states (one bit, LH: RL at Alice, RH at 
Bob; and HL: RH at Alice, RL at Bob) that can be detected by 
them, but will remain hidden for the eavesdropper. 
A more realistic realization can be seen on Fig. 1. Here the 
very small Johnson noise of the resistors is emulated by 
voltage noise generators providing the same kind of noise with 
much higher amplitude – equivalent to increasing the 
temperature to a very high value [1]. The resistance of the 
interconnecting wire Rc is zero in the ideal system, but should 
be considered in practical realizations as we’ll address this 
question in this work later. 
Although numerous papers have been published in the 
field there is still an ongoing debate about the security of the 
KLJN system. Several attacks against the security of the 
protocol were discussed [2-7], but the ideal KLJN system is 
still considered to be secure. Besides the original proof of 
security based on physical laws [1], a purely mathematical 
statistical evidence has also been shown [8, 9]. However, 
during the realization it is inevitable to introduce non-
idealities into the system. These non-idealities are caused by 
wire resistances and wire attenuation, tolerance of the 
components including resistor values, voltage noise amplitude, 
external noise sources - any of these can cause significant 
information leak [10, 11] in the system, therefore can serve as 
the basis of different attacks. In our paper we give a detailed 
overview of the latest findings about the security of the KLJN 
system. 
 
Fig. 1. Schematic of the KLJN key exchange system.  
II. SECURITY OF THE KLJN SYSTEM 
A. Noise requirenments 
Using the classical physical approach it was shown that 
Gaussian white noise can ensure security and the following 
requirement must be satisfied [1]: LHLH RR , 
where H and L are the standard deviations of the noise 
voltages VH and VL, respectively. Later it has been shown that 
only Gaussian noise can guarantee security [9], where the joint 
probability of the voltage VE and current IE can be observed by 
Eve are used in the analysis. In the following we use this joint 
probability density to estimate the effect of some practical 
parameters of a real KLJN system. 1
It has already been pointed out by Bergou [12], Scheuer 
and Yariv [4] that finite interconnecting cable resistance Rc 
can cause information leak. Later Kish has introduced a 
method to completely eliminate this leak by adjusting the 
amplitude of the noise generators [13]. On Fig. 2 we show an 
example on how Eve can distinguish between HL and LH 
states. On the figure there is the scatter plot of VE versus IE, 
the slope of the fitted line gives us the required information to 
extract bits. Note that the parameters are deliberately set to 
incorrect values to magnify the effect. 
 
Fig. 2. Illustration of the method of extracting information from the KLJN 
system using joint probability. In the simulation 2000 samples were generated, 
and RL=1000 Ohm, RH=10000 Ohm, RC=800 Ohm, while σH/ σL is. 
B. Effects of resistance and voltage tolerance 
The limited accuracy of the resistors and voltage amplitude 
(that can depend on temperature in the original model) can 
also be sources of information leak. [1, 2]. One can easily see 
that according to Eq. (1) the error in resistance has smaller 
impact on security, since a small change in any of the resistor 
values causes smaller error in the equation than 1% deviation 
in the noise amplitude. On Fig. 3 the bit error rate as a 
function of the relative error of the resistance and voltage can 
be seen.  
 
Fig. 3. Bit error rate as a function of the relative error of the nominal value of 
the resistance and voltage amplitude. Red and blue curves correspond to 
resistance and voltage changes, respectively. The measurement length was 
100 correlation times, 5000000 bits were transferred.  
C. Cable properties 
As it was mentioned above, the finite cable resistance if 
not compensated can cause information leak. Fig. 4 shows the 
simulation result for the bit error rate as a function of the cable 
resistance Rc. Eve will extract more and more information as 
the cable resistance increases. 
 
Fig. 4. Bit error rate as a function of cable resistance The measurement 
length was 100 correlation times, 5000000 bits were transferred. 
D. Cable vulnerability against external noise sources 
In the current implementations of the KLJN system the 
resistance values are between 1 kOhm and 10 kOhm. This 
relatively high impedance makes the communication wire 
vulnerable to external noises which may be coupled in a 
capacitive or inductive way. 
While the high frequency disturbances may be reduced by 
proper filtering, low frequency external noises, like 50/60 Hz 
and its harmonics may also influence the quantities measured 
on the wire. In one of our test we measured the voltage across 
a 3 m properly shielded coaxial wire with a differental 
amplifier (gain=2000). Although the cable was wound in a 
non-inductive bifilar configuration we could measure a 
relatively high 50 Hz component and several of its harmonics 
(Fig. 5). In order to reduce the effect we applied a 100 Hz high 
pass filter as used in [14], but as can be seen on the figure, it 
was not capable of reducing the higher frequency components, 
which were right in the frequency band of the communication. 
Although we identified the source of the interference (a nearby 
high quality Hameg HMP2030 laboratory power supply) this 
measurement showed that it is not trivial to get rid of the 
disturbances, and without proper measurement one should not 
assume that the system is properly protected against external 
noises. 
 
Fig. 5. Mains picup across a 3 m shielded cable after 2000x amplification. A 
100 filter was applied to reduce the effect, but it is not enough in this 
case. 
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III. ANALYSIS OF THE DIRECTIONAL COUPLER ATTACK 
In [14] Gunn et al presented a very interesting and original 
method for breaking the KLJN system. The method assumes 
that even in the no-wave limit operation of the KLJN system, 
the wave propagation is still applicable, moreover the waves 
travelling between Alice and Bob can be separated by a 
directional coupler. Based on this method the authors show 
that Eve may get reliable information about the exchanged bit 
in an astonishing short time (in some cases even within one 
correlation time). 
However, their analysis also showed an important result: 
even if we can distinguish the right and left travelling waves, 
information leak only occurs if there is any attenuation in the 
system. If not, the directional coupler based attack cannot 
extract any information from the system. 
Some aspects of the directional coupler attack were 
analyzed in a [15] and [16], one of the most important findings 
is that the attenuation rates which are causing excessive 
information leaks do not fulfill some basic restrictions of the 
KLJN system (like there cannot be any significant leakage 
current in the wire). Despite of the critics the “Gunn method” 
may still be applicable for lower attenuation values and may 
be used for information extraction. For further investigation of 
the method we performed numeric simulations and we 
reproduced some elements of the directional coupler system 
based on [14] and the additional information the authors 
provided to us. 
A. Significant difference between the theory and measurement 
Comparing Figure 3 and 5 of article [14] it is hard not to 
notice that there is a significant difference between the theory 
and the practice. For cable attenuation of 0.1 according to the 
theory the 0.001 error rate is reached at around 90 correlation 
times while according to the measurement, this BER is already 
reached below 20 correlation times. The question is: what kind 
of artefacts may cause such a significant difference? In the 
next part we will show some problematic points. 
In order to separate the right and left travelling wave Gunn 
et al are using a directional coupler. However, rather than 
calculating the exact coefficient values, the authors are using 
an LMS based adaptive filter to perform this task. The filter is 
calibrated when the end of the cable is terminated by a 50 
Ohm resistor, the calibration is considered to be successful 
when the error drops below a given threshold. The benefit of 
this method is that imperfections in the directional coupler can 
be eliminated. At the same time, the result is affected by any 
other imperfection of the system and the result may not be the 
desired one. For example, according to our simulations the 
calibration can be considered to be “successful” even if there 
is no wave propagation. In this case, while the “right travelling 
wave” and the “left travelling wave” can still be used to 
extract information from the system, it is a different effect 
than the one stated by the theory. In our experimental tests we 
found similar results, although the resistance of the cable and 
connectors was significant, the calibration was also successful.  
Similarly to the directional coupler, the second analysis 
step is also calibrated to the actual system. While this 
calibration may eliminate imperfections in the eavesdropping 
equipment and may give us promising results, nothing 
guarantees that it will behave according to the theory. This 
way we do not know whether the leakage is caused by wave 
propagation, cable attenuation or some other artefact like 
external noise (see section II/D), tolerance of components, 
unintended asymmetry of the test equipment or inadequate 
noise generation. 
B. Effect of cable resistance and attenuation 
In [14] the author performed measurements while using 
the following attenuation values: 0.1 dB, 0.2 dB and 1 dB. 
Since the last two ones were performed by inserting an in-line 
attenuator into the KLJN system which violates the KLJN 
principles [16] the only relevant case is the 0.1 dB case which 
is measured using a 2 m coaxial cable. 
We examined the datasheets of some commercially 
available coaxial cables and found that there is usually no 
attenuation data for frequencies below 1 MHz. At lower 
frequencies the effect of the cable inductance and cable 
capacitance becomes lower and lower, at the bandwidth of the 
KLJN the cable resistance dominates the attenuation. In order 
to get an estimation of the attenuation we measured the 
resistance of two different 3 m long cables which were 
connected to the system through BNC connectors. The total 
resistance of the RG58 cable with connectors was 0.257 Ohm 
while the resistance of the RG174 cable was 1.012 Ohm. If we 
terminate the cable with a 50 Ohm resistor, the resulting 
attenuation values are 0.05 dB and 0.17 dB respectively, 
which are comparable with the values Gunn et al measured. 
However, in the KLJN system, the smallest resistance in the 
system is typically 1000 Ohm yielding to attenuation values 
less than 0.01 dB. For this reason we conclude that the model 
of cable attenuation cannot be applied to the KLJN system as 
Gunn et al done. 
Based on the available data we can calculate the voltage 
difference measurable on the cable.. Assuming a sinusoid 
signal with an amplitude of 1 V, a cable length of 3 m and a 
frequency of 5 kHz, the amplitude caused by wave 
propagation is 0.48 mV. If the cable is terminated by a 50 
Ohm during the calibration procedure [14], the resulting 
voltage drop is 4.97 mV, an order of magnitude greater than 
the voltage measurable due to the wave propagation. Our 
opinion is that this voltage drop must significantly altered the 
calibration procedure. At the same time, during the KLJN key 
exchange, since the loop resistance is around 11 kOhm, the 
voltage drop will be order of magnitude smaller than the wave 
effect, rendering the original calibration useless. 
IV. MITIGATION OF THE PRIVACY LEAK 
From the previous two parts it is clear that non-idealities of 
the implementation of the KLJN system will cause 
information leak. The severity of the information leakage can 
be mitigated by different tools. In [17] Horvath et al 
introduced an effective method for privacy amplification. The 
drawback of the method that it significantly reduce the key 
exchange rate. 
In [13] Kish et al showed a method to eliminate the effect 
of cable resistance by modifying the noise scaling coefficient 
according to the actual cable resistance. While the method is 3
efficient, not all source of information leak can be eliminated 
this way. In the following we show a method that is 
independent of the source of the leak, and can be used against 
any statistical method based attack. 
On Fig. 6 we present an example, where the statistics of 
HL and LH cases are distinguishable due to the cable 
resistance. The difference gives Eve the opportunity to 
successfully guess 60 % of the bits. To decrease Eve’s success 
rate we can deliberately drop secure bits in order to achieve a 
completely overlapping statistic. At each secure bit, based on 
its measured parameters (like voltage SD difference) one can 
calculate the probability it should be dropped to achieve the 
best security. For the previous example, the resulting statistics 
is presented in the same figure (HH-leak.red and LH-leak.red. 
lines). By dropping the 20 % of the bits, the probability for 
Eve to guess the bits is reduced to 50.02 %. 
 
Fig. 6. Example of the effect of reducing privacy leak by deliberateli 
dropping secure bits. The HL and LH lines are the original statistics, the HL-
leak.red. and LH-leak.red are the resulting statistics (note, they are complitly 
overlapping). 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
Although the KLJN system may provide a low cost 
alternative to the quantum key distribution (QKD) a careful 
design is needed to provide adequate safety and mitigate 
privacy leakage. 
In this paper we have reviewed and analyzed the effect of 
the parameters such as noise amplitude, tolerance of resistors 
or the cable resistance that may significantly affect the 
security of the system and if not properly handled may cause 
information leakage. At the same time we also demonstrated 
that this leak can be significantly reduced by deliberately 
dropping secure bits. The drawback of this method that the bit 
exchange rate will be reduced. 
We also analyzed the attack method suggested by Gunn et al 
[14] and found that some aspects of the implementation may 
introduce such artefacts in the measurement that would 
compromise the results. Note that it is an important 
implication of the Gunn method that the wave propagation 
itself does not cause information leakage. 
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